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NATURAL PROVIDENCE: 
REPLY TO DEMBSKI 
Michael J. Murray 
In No Free Lunch William Dembski presents a reply to the argument against 
intelligent design theory (IDT) I offered in "Natural Providence (or Design 
Trouble)." In this essay I reply to Dembski and describe a brief proposal for a 
model of providence that might be more congenial to the advocate of TOT. 
In "Natural Providence (or Design Trouble)" I presented arguments de-
fending the claim that the alternatives to methodological naturalism 
which have been defended by friends of Intelligent Design Theory (lOT) 
should be rejected.1 In making this argument, I commended a Leibniz-
ian conception of providence according to which the states of the natural 
world, excluding those caused directly by free creatures, come about by 
means of God's creation of the initial state of the universe and the subse-
quent unfolding of the succeeding states via nomically regular processes. 
As a result, when we seek to explain states of affairs in the natural world, 
we should do so by appeal to the existence of natural entities and their 
powers. William Dembski has published a reply to this argument. I argue 
here that the reply is not convincing. 
The argument I present in "Natural Providence" had two stages. First, 
I argued that since most states of affairs (at least those not caused by free 
human agents) come to be via nomically regular means, and since there 
is no way for the scientist to distinguish empirically between those states 
generated by nomically regular means and those caused by direct divine 
intervention, properly scientific explanations will be naturalistic. Second, I 
argued that since there are some suggestive, if not compelling, reasons for 
thinking that God would create the world in Leibnizian fashion, scientists 
who are theists should favor naturalistic explanations in science. This pair 
of arguments should at least make the scientist who is also a theist wary, to 
say the least, of proposals to jettison methodological naturalism in science. 
I argued for the claim of the first stage by focusing on a case in which 
one player in a poker game repeatedly draws four aces, thereby winning 
every hand. It would be clear to anyone who was shown the outcomes 
of each round that the apparently fortunate player had cheated. That is, 
it would be clear that intelligent agency has been involved in securing 
the outcomes. However, there would be no way of knowing whether the 
result had come about as a result of some intervention by the cheater, or 
rather by allowing the cheater to have access to the cards before the game 
so that he could stack the deck. The empirical evidence simply will not 
allow this discrimination. Of course, the same will be true when we are 
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talking about the natural world, where the intelligent agent is not a card 
player, but the creator. As a result, there is no reason to favor explanations 
of apparently designed states of affairs in nature by appeal to divine inter-
vention. When we combine this result with the fact that the universe seems 
almost unexceptionally nomically regular, and that there are good reasons 
for God to create and govern the world via nomically regular means, the 
theist has good reason to retain methodological naturalism as a constraint 
in scientific theorizing. 
Dembski offers two replies. First, he claims that even though interven-
tion and deck-stacking might be empirically equivalent, we should only 
favor deck-stacking explanations when we can trace the information con-
tent necessary to produce the apparently designed state back to the begin-
ning. He considers, for example, the Cambrian explosion, a five to ten mil-
lion year span of natural history when most of the basic metazoan body 
plans emerged. This rapid increase in biological complexity seems to have 
emerged out of quite simple precursor conditions. If we measure such 
complexity in terms of information content we might say, as Dembski 
does, that "the information needed to build the animals of the Cambrian 
period was suddenly expressed at that time and with no evident informa-
tional precursors."2 We might assume that the necessary complexity was 
somehow programmed into precursor states in a way that is opaque to us, 
but "there is no evidence for it and there is no reason ... to think that all 
naturally occurring information must be traceable back in this way.":; 
The conclusion of this line of reasoning seems to be this: unless we have 
reason to think that precursor states contain the information content neces-
sary to produce the apparently designed state, we should assume that the 
information content is imparted when it first becomes manifest. Perhaps 
that's true. However, in this case there are prima facie reasons to think that 
the information content necessary to produce such complex states is pres-
ent prior to its manifestation, namely the reasons I offered: first, that this 
is the only way to generate such complexity through the pattern of provi-
dence we see across times and places, that is, through nomically regular 
natural processes, and second, that there are good reasons for thinking 
that God would favor a world which unfolds by nomic ally regular means. 
Until we deal with those arguments, Dembski's conclusion will have no 
traction against my argument. 
In his second reply, Dembski argues that even though intervention and 
deck-stacking are empirically equivalent, there are other values in theory 
choice that might tip the balance towards explanations that invoke inter-
vention. As he notes, the hypothesis that the world was created five min-
utes ago with all of the apparent signs of age it has, is empirically equiva-
lent to the reigning cosmological hypothesis that the world is fourteen 
billion years old. Yet this does not lead us to throw up our hands when it 
comes to deciding between the two. 
Fair enough. But Dembski does nothing to tell us which other theo-
retical values we should bring to bear. As a result, we might fairly say 
that consistency, simplicity, and scope, to name three oft-cited theoretical 
values, would tend to favor deck-stacking explanations over intervention 
explanations. After all such naturalistic explanations are in fact the correct 
explanations in nearly every case. In addition, as I have noted, the theist 
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has additional reasons for thinking that a Leibnizian conception of natural 
providence is to be preferred. 
In order to mount a response to the argument I offered, Dembski and 
other friends of IDT will need to say something about those additional 
reasons. I think there is more to be said, and not all of it is favorable to the 
view I have defended. Since I was defending the Leibnizian position in 
"Natural Providence" I was not inclined to highlight the considerations 
unfavorable to my view. But I think that they are worth considering. As a 
result, I herewith offer the friends of IDT some suggestions which might 
provide a better angle of attack. 
As I have said, the two reasons I cited for favoring the Leibnizian pic-
hue, and thus methodological naturalism in science, are that it seems to 
cohere with the order of things we find in nature, and that there are rea-
sons for thinking that God would orchestrate the affairs of the natural 
world in such a way. Let's leave aside the first reason since it is really more 
of a tie breaking reason when we have empirically equivalent explana-
tions. What does the second reason amount to? As I cast the exchange be-
tween Newton and Leibniz on the issue of providence over nature, Leib-
niz makes heavy weather over the fact that the Newtonian God appears to 
be a designer of less than adequate competence. What sort of God would 
actualize a creation which would require periodic intervention to keep 
things from collapsing into disorder and chaos? Leibniz's answer: only 
one with less than perfect knowledge, power, or goodness. 
There is something very attractive about this position. When I bought 
my first car, the manufacturer recommended a tune up every twenty thou-
sand miles or so. Cars rolling off the assembly line today hardly need any-
thing like a tune up. With many of these cars, the sort of routine service 
that would in the past be required every twenty thousand miles, need 
only be done every fifty or one hundred thousand miles. Better engineers 
with greater understanding and better raw materials are now producing 
better cars. And I think we suppose that were General Motors to take on 
a few omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good engineers, cars would be 
utterly maintenance free (less than wholly good engineers might be able 
to design such cars, but undoubtedly their greed would get the better of 
them). The same intuition underlies the Leibnizian picture. If God knows 
how to bring about all of the states of affairs he wishes to bring about in 
the course of natural history by deck-staking, what would motivate the 
creation of a universe that was in need of periodic tune ups? 
Dembski addresses this issue in passing in the same book when he re-
sponds to Howard Van Till. Like Leibniz, Van Till argues that the inter-
ventionist picture requires appeal to a God who cannot, or at least refuses, 
to provide creation with all that it needs to accomplish its ends. Dembski 
contends that this may be a fair criticism of the interventionist picture if 
we conceive of the relation between God and world on analogy with that 
between clockmaker and clock. But why focus on this analogy? Perhaps 
we should instead think of it on the analogy of musician and instrument. 
In that case, deck-stacking seems rather perverse. Why would we form the 
expectation that a perfect pianist would create a player piano, rather than 
one which required the activity of the musician to perform its function?4 I 
suspect that many readers will find that the musician analogy unappeal-
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ing, motioning, as it does, in the direction of something like process the-
ism. 
Still, Dembski's point here bears further scrutiny. We can imagine some-
one arguing with Van Till, or Leibniz, or me, in the following way: 
While mechanistic philosophers of the seventeenth century might 
have been inclined towards the analogy of clockmaking, there is 
surely something perverse about such a picture. For the Christian 
at least, creation is in large part a love story. God's overflowing love 
and goodness leads him to create a world into which he intends to 
continue to pour forth his love and goodness. The creation is a child, 
a bride, a lover, not a mechanical curiosity to be displayed on the 
mantle of the divine living room. If creation is created for relation-
ship, the perversity of the Leibnizian picture becomes especially ap-
parent. Imagine that we are introduced to someone with whom we 
want to develop a deep and fulfilling relationship of love. God then 
pulls us aside and offers us the following choice. Since God knows 
everything that will happen in the life of this person he can offer you 
two options. First, you can enter this relationship and live with your 
beloved, laboring with them and sharing in their joys, passions, and 
sorrows. Second, God can tell you up front everything that will ever 
happen to them, and then you can assist God in designing an au-
tomaton which will look and act like you, and which will live with 
your beloved and interact with them in just the way you would if 
you were actually present. You can then leave your beloved behind 
and go off to watch the drama unfold by webcam at the beach in 
Bermuda. Which would you choose? Why of course it is the first! 
Why? Because what we desire in love is not simply the well-being of 
the beloved, or the opportunity to help the beloved achieve fulfill-
ment, but the experience of actively loving the beloved as well. That 
is why a loving God would surely find a Leibnizian conception of 
providence repugnant. 
The words of this imaginary critic are powerful. One might reply that they 
are only powerful insofar as they concern God's relationship with persons, 
not the natural world itself. But the Christian will have a hard time accept-
ing this restriction, especially in light of the Biblical emphasis on God's 
passion for redeeming all of creation. Redemption of persons surely has a 
special place in providence, but not an exclusive one. 
I do not intend to try to resolve the question of which analogy is most 
apt. However, it seems to me that friends of lOT would do well to fo-
cus more on these questions. If the slim evidence we have only provides 
us with reasons for a deck-stacking picture of natural providence, then 
methodological naturalism should be favored. If the evidence tips in an-
other direction, perhaps it should not. Friends of lOT owe us the con-
traryevidence.5 
University of Notre Darnel 
Franklin and Marshall College 
NATURAL PROVIDENCE 341 
NOTES 
1. Faith and Philosophy, Volume 20, no.2 (July 2003), pp. 307-27. 
2. William Dembski, No Free Lunch Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2001), p. 345. 
3. Ibid., p. 346. 
4. Ibid., p. 328. 
5. Special thanks are due to the Note Dame Center for Philosophy of Reli-
gion and the American Philosophical Society both of which provided support 
for the leave during which this essay was written. Thanks also to William 
Hasker for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
